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Abstract
This paper presents a cognitive task analysis to derive models of decision-making for rail maintenance processes. Mainte-
nance processes are vital for safe and continuous availability of rail assets and services. These processes are increasingly 
embracing the ‘Intelligent Infrastructure’ paradigm, which uses automated analysis to predict asset state and potential failure. 
Understanding the cognitive processes of maintenance operators is critical to underpin design and acceptance of Intelligent 
Infrastructure. A combination of methods, including observation, interview and an adaptation of critical decision method, 
was employed to elicit the decision-making strategies of operators in three different types of maintenance control centre, with 
three configurations of pre-existing technology. The output is a model of decision-making, based on Rasmussen’s decision 
ladder, that reflects the varying role of automation depending on technology configurations. The analysis also identifies which 
types of fault were most challenging for operators and identifies the strategies used by operators to manage the concurrent 
challenges of information deficiencies (both underload and overload). Implications for design are discussed.
Keywords Rail maintenance · Human–automation · User-centred design · Decision-making
1 Introduction
Railway Maintenance Control Centres are responsible for 
ensuring the continuous availability of infrastructure assets. 
Technological advances, including Remote Condition Moni-
toring (RCM) systems, are commonly used within these cen-
tres to provide reliable, real-time data regarding the status 
of assets and, consequently, to enhance operators’ situation 
awareness and decision-making. Increasingly, these control 
environments are embracing predictive maintenance and 
‘Intelligent Infrastructure’ (Pedregal et al. 2004; Ollier 2006; 
Dadashi et al. 2014). In Intelligent Infrastructure, diverse 
sources of data regarding the current and historical state of 
the asset, or fleet of similar assets, are combined with con-
textual data (e.g. usage patterns or weather) to predict the 
future state of the asset, likely performance, and potential 
failure (Ollier 2006).
Despite much work on technical aspects of Intelligent 
Infrastructure in rail and other contexts (e.g. Ollier 2006; 
Khan 2007; Márquez et al. 2003; Durazo-Cardenas et al. 
2018; Vileiniskis et al. 2016), there are significant gaps in 
effective user-centred design and organisational deploy-
ment (Dadashi et al. 2014; Ciocoiu et al. 2017). The ques-
tion remains as to whether introducing these technological 
advances will lead to a change in the way operators make 
decisions when they are conducting cognitive processing 
associated with fault finding. The vital challenge for future 
technology is to achieve optimum presentation of informa-
tion while complementing operators’ existing expectations. 
Technology adoption and efficient utilisation of Intelligent 
Infrastructure is, therefore, dependent on careful alignment 
with operators’ expertise, decision-making and major coping 
strategies. Not only does this help the acceptance process, 
many of these coping strategies indicate the important con-
straints, such as workload or gaps in information, that shape 
the way operators work.
Design requires a combination of sequential and contex-
tual approaches to understand socio-technical performance 
(Bainbridge 1997). The present paper explores railway main-
tenance operators in Great Britain (GB) with an approach 
that combines both unstructured observation and structured 
cognitive task analysis to understand the general nature and 
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constraints of maintenance decision-making (contextual) 
and model the decision-making environments through the 
theoretical lens of the Decision Ladder (Rasmussen 1986) 
(sequential). This approach is used to determine the relation-
ship between technology and decision-making, particularly 
with regards to coping strategies (Hollnagel and Woods 
2005).
The scope of this paper is the immediate response to a 
fault, given that this can be amongst the most challenging 
situations in rail operations (Golightly and Dadashi 2017). 
The initial steps associated with identifying and managing a 
fault are crucial (Belmonte et al. 2011) and failure to rapidly 
identify and diagnose a problem can lead to ‘out-of-control’ 
situations and significant rail disruption (Dekker 2018). 
Also, false alarms and multiple alarms are known problems 
for workload and genuine fault detection (Wilkinson and 
Lucas 2002; Seagull and Sanderson 2001).
The primary contribution of the paper is to give detailed 
analysis of a key function of the railway, maintenance con-
trol, that has received almost no human factors attention yet 
is critical to safe, high-performance operations. Second, the 
current paper contributes to the small, but growing, body 
of knowledge around human factors for predictive mainte-
nance and Intelligent Infrastructure in rail by complementing 
Human–Machine Interface (HMI) design work (Houghton 
and Patel 2015), more organisational work (Dadashi et al. 
2014; Ciocoiu et al. 2015, 2017; Kefalidou et al. 2015) and 
work in the related domain of electrical control (Dadashi 
et al. 2016) with cognitive analyses of maintenance opera-
tor decision-making. As such, this paper constitutes the first 
stage of ISO9241-210 (Understand and Specify context of 
use) for the development of advanced rail maintenance sys-
tems. Third, the paper demonstrates the practical applica-
tion of some of the key methods (facilitation, observation, 
cognitive task analysis) and representational formats (the 
Decision Ladder) to structure our understanding of cognition 
and work in maintenance environments. These methods and 
analyses are crucial to systemic approaches such as Cogni-
tive Work Analysis (Vicente 1999) or Event Analysis for 
Systemic Teamwork (EAST) (Walker et al. 2006).
2  Railway maintenance and cognition
2.1  The rail context
Rail infrastructure assets are safety critical. Failures of assets 
can lead to catastrophic accidents such as the derailments at 
Potter’s Bar (Butcher 2012) and Gray Rigg (Rail Accident 
Investigation Branch 2011), both of which involved fatali-
ties and acted as catalysts to significant changes in Great 
Britain’s (GB) rail sector. In addition, the need to go out in 
the field and inspect or maintain assets can be dangerous, 
requiring rigorous protection regimes to ensure the safety of 
trackworkers (Golightly et al. 2013). Finally, asset availabil-
ity is a performance issue with asset failure being a source 
of significant delay and customer dissatisfaction (Pant et al. 
2016; Transportfocus 2017). The pattern seen in Great Brit-
ain is replicated globally (e.g. Belmonte et al. 2011), as 
evinced by reliable rail infrastructure being a core pillar of 
the EU Shift2Rail programme (Shift2Rail 2015).
Maintenance control for rail is responsible for the safe 
and timely maintaining of the rail infrastructure. In this way, 
maintenance control supports the real-time operations of the 
railways by communicating the availability of assets to front-
line roles such as signallers. Maintenance control also sup-
ports the mid-term goals of the railways by setting out plans 
for renewal work and maintenance programmes. Finally, 
maintenance control contributes to the strategic goals of the 
railway by informing large-scale renewal and replacement of 
assets (van Amstel-van Saane 2007; Kefalidou et al. 2015).
While maintenance may be planned in accordance with 
pre-defined schedules, fault detection is also a key process. 
A fault can be reported by an individual such as a track 
worker, member of public (e.g. social media contact regard-
ing a rough ride), signaller, driver or sensed through wide 
range of remote condition monitoring equipment. Fault 
reports are fed into a control environment where severity 
and time-sensitivity of the fault are investigated, and a main-
tenance action is planned and instructed to track workers. 
Therefore, one of the key activities of maintenance control 
is responding to fault reports in the form of alarms.
Predictive technology such as Intelligent Infrastructure 
is dependent on some degree of automation and decision 
support for an operator. This automation is in part due to 
analytical overhead of sensing multiple data streams from 
multiple assets, and in part due to the algorithms for cal-
culating prediction of risk and failure associated with an 
asset. The volume of sensed data, and the complexity of 
calculation, necessitates automation. With the shift to 
prognostic systems, alarms will move from informing the 
operator of a current or recent event (e.g. failure of a piece 
of infrastructure) to include anticipatory alarms that warn 
the operator of an emerging risk (e.g. potential or future 
failure of a piece of infrastructure) (Dadashi et al. 2014). 
Concomitantly, alarms will shift from simple prompts for 
an operator to carry out further actions, including making 
diagnoses, through to semantically rich messages carrying 
verbal, textual or pictorial information about the source or 
cause of the abnormality.
While there is a range of technology developments in 
the field of asset monitoring and predictive maintenance 
(Durazo-Cardenas et  al. 2018; Vileiniskis et  al. 2016; 
Shafiee et  al. 2019), at some stage, these technologies 
have to be integrated within the maintenance control envi-
ronment. Infrastructure sensing and analysis requires the 
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understanding of heterogeneous data sources and techni-
cal components (Ranjan et al. 2017); so, the organisations 
adopting advanced maintenance analytics need greater 
degrees of technical knowledge to interpret the data (Aboe-
lmaged 2014) that often spans organisational boundaries. 
The human factors implications of such innovation are 
substantial, encompassing the user-centered design of tech-
nology, knowledge and change management, and training 
(Dadashi et al. 2014; Golightly et al. 2018).
In a context such as the railways, change is nearly always 
incremental, so there are always questions of technical inte-
gration of legacy systems (Kefalidou et al. 2015), along 
with the challenge of integrating configurations of new and 
old technology within pre-existing processes and structures 
(Ciocoiu et al. 2015). The volume of legacy in the railways, 
and the need to provide continuity of service to the railways 
wherever possible, even during major infrastructural change, 
mean that there is rarely a ‘big bang’ that allows radical 
overhaul of the control environment. Often, the local aspects 
of legacy (e.g. is there AC or DC traction? are there a num-
ber of critical, high demand points, signals, etc. as one might 
expect near a major junction or terminus?) are reflected in 
different asset management systems, procured at different 
times by different suppliers (Ollier 2006). This presents a 
challenge for new systems as each control environment has 
its own idiosyncrasies. It is critical to characterise this vari-
ation to predict the impact of a new technology and, where 
possible, configure it to local demands. There is, however, an 
opportunity in looking across control settings, as it allows us 
to pull out regularities in how operators handle maintenance 
control—strategies, decisions, and requirements—irrespec-
tive of local conditions.
The rest of this paper will focus primarily on mainte-
nance, and specifically fault analysis decision-making, as 
the major topic of interest, with a view to understanding 
how it is influenced by different maintenance environments 
including current legacy technology. The key research ques-
tions are:
1. What is the context of maintenance control and decision-
making?
2. What is the nature of fault decision-making, and how are 
strategies applied to manage time pressure, information 
overload or information gaps?
3. What do models of these decisions look like, and what 
are the differences that emerge due to the differing con-
texts of maintenance control?
2.2  Theoretical background and approach
Control environments are moving more towards integra-
tion and centralisation. The diversity of activities in control 
rooms, and the highly cognitive nature of work, can impose 
a severe challenge for understanding the work of the opera-
tors, and designing effective systems. Operators often have 
a sequential, rule-based approach towards certain sources of 
information (Johannsen 1997). Presenting this information 
in a cohesive way that matches operators’ mental models 
and cognitive processing is essential for designing effective 
decision aids. This necessitates appropriate methods for data 
collection, in alliance with an appropriate theoretical frame-
work to analyse and model results.
Rasmussen and Lind (1982) specified that the route to 
in-depth understanding of control settings is through inves-
tigating an operator’s activities rather than reviewing system 
requirements. A combination of sequential and contextual 
data collection and analysis should be conducted to ensure 
that diverse nuances of human behaviour working within 
control environments are understood and reflected in design 
(Bainbridge 1997).
The current study of maintenance control fault-finding 
response used a series of observational and field studies to 
develop an in-depth understanding of maintenance control 
rooms. Three different control environments were studied to 
reflect different local conditions and legacy both in terms of 
control equipment and rail infrastructure.
The approach used a combination of observation, infor-
mal interview and field study, coupled with a more struc-
tured knowledge elicitation activity. This knowledge elicita-
tion was informed by the Critical Decision Method (CDM) 
(Klein et al. 1989; O’Hare et al. 1998). Participants were 
asked to recall a recent, challenging fault-finding incident, 
but then asked to consider each incident in terms of four 
stages. These four stages, derived from a study of railway 
electrical control (Dadashi et al. 2016) and based on models 
of alarm handling (Stanton 2006), were:
1. Receiving notification of the fault (Notification)
2. Checking if it is genuine (Acceptance)
3. Diagnosing the fault (Analysis)
4. Developing a course of corrective action (Clearance)
Given that one of the stated aims of the study was to 
compare different working contexts, a structure is needed 
to describe decision-making in each environment and com-
pare it across settings. The lens for this work was Rasmus-
sen’s Decision Ladder (1986). While this is a component 
of Cognitive Work Analysis (Vicente 1999) it predates 
CWA and can be used as a representational form in its own 
right (e.g. Banks et al. 2020). The decision ladder aims to 
identify various information processing types. These types 
can be categorised into two groups: (1) information pro-
cessing activities, and (2) the state of knowledge resulting 
from information processing. The general information flow 
forms a template with each information type shown with 
different symbols—typically, a box to represent processing 
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and a circle to represent the result. The Decision Ladder 
can also represent shortcuts through cognitive processing, 
known as shunts and leaps, therefore supporting the expres-
sion of the kind of cognitive activity that is typical of expert 
performance. These shortcuts can also come as the result 
of automation that replaces the need for knowledge-based 
analysis on the part of the operator. By mapping a decision-
making process on a Decision Ladder template, it is possible 
to map out the stages of cognitive processing, where there 
may be shortcuts (due to expertise or automation) and how 
this decision ladder may vary due to different constraints 
such as the availability of technology. In this study, the aim 
was to specify a decision ladder that fitted all maintenance 
fault-finding situations, but with a secondary outcome of 
identifying differences in the ladders due to different control 
rooms.
Finally, factors such as time pressure or gaps in infor-
mation can lead to the operator applying coping strategies. 
This is an expression of the need to balance thoroughness 
of analysis, with efficiency (Hollnagel 2011). This trade-off 
is exacerbated when information is either incomplete/insuf-
ficient, or the operator is overwhelmed by information. Also, 
operators are likely to be human (for the foreseeable future) 
with cognitive biases, for example in their ability to interpret 
cumulative probabilities or in their assessment of risk (Cos-
tello and Watts 2014; Sundh and Juslin 2018). These fac-
tors lead to a set of coping strategies. Hollnagel and Woods 
(2005) proposed a taxonomy of typical coping strategies (see 
Table 1). These strategies allow the operator to deal with 
differing volumes and quality of information, and express 
one aspect of the bounded rationality of cognitive systems. 
Therefore, a step in the analysis was to apply these strategies 
to the observed and described processes of fault finding.
3  Methods
A series of data collection and analysis activities were con-
ducted to tackle the research questions explored in this study, 
capturing both contextual and sequential aspects of mainte-
nance fault finding. Figure 1 shows a diagram that summa-
rises these research activities and their outputs.
3.1  Domain familiarisation
A series of field observations, open structured interviews 
and workshops were conducted to facilitate familiarisation 
with various types of maintenance control centres. This 
included understanding existing remote condition monitor-
ing technologies that are currently in use within railways. 
Details were collected of the main responsibilities, work 
settings and a brief description of fault analysis processes 
in these control rooms.
To start, a 1-h interview was conducted with a senior 
railway operator to facilitate the identification of various 
types of railway maintenance control centres and to cat-
egorise these in terms of geographical coverage and types 
of equipment. Three different types of control room were 
selected on the basis of these recommendations. These 
control rooms, although similar in terms of their job speci-
fications and responsibilities, had different technologies 
that were also distributed in different configurations. These 
Table 1  Coping strategy taxonomy from Hollnagel and Woods (2005)
Strategy Information overload/
insufficient information
Definition
Omission Overload Temporary, arbitrary non-processing of information is lost
Reduced precision Overload Trading precision for speed and time, all input is considered, but only superficially; reasoning is 
shallower
Queuing Overload Delaying response during high load, on the assumption that it will be possible to catch-up later 
(stacking input)
Filtering Overload Neglecting to process certain categories; non-processed information is lost
Cutting categories Overload Reduce the level of discrimination; use fewer grades or categories to describe input
Decentralisation Overload Distributing processing if possible; calling in assistance
Escape Overload Abandoning the task; giving up completely; leaving the field
Extrapolation Insufficient information Existing evidence is ‘stretched’ to fit a new situation; extrapolation is usually linear, and is often 
based on fallacious causal reasoning
Frequency gambling Insufficient information The frequency of occurrence of past items/events? is used as a basis for recognition/selection
Similarity matching Insufficient information The subjective similarity of past to present items/event is used as a basis for recognition/selec-
tion
Trial-and-error (ran-
dom selection)
Insufficient information Interpretations and/or selection do not follow any systematic principle
Laissez-faire Insufficient information An independent strategy is given up in lieu of just doing what others do
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control rooms were selected based on the amount and type 
of RCM equipment they have and are referred to as loca-
tion A, B and C throughout this paper.
Document review was also conducted. This covered 
specification of the RCM equipment, procedural manu-
als, and roles and responsibilities of maintenance techni-
cians. The initial input from the senior railway operator 
was followed by three field visits of 4 h each (total of 12 h) 
conducted in the three-maintenance control centres. This 
involved general observation of activities, and unstruc-
tured discussions with operational staff regarding tasks, 
priorities and the nature of maintenance work.
3.2  Critical decision method
3.2.1  Participants
Maintenance technicians at each location (A, B and C) 
were approached with the proposed study aims and invited 
to participate. Two maintenance technicians from each of 
the selected Maintenance Control Centres (MCC) partici-
pated in this study (n = 6). Participants were all male with 
an average age of 43 years, an average of 22 years of expe-
rience in various sectors of the railway, and they were all 
experienced at the task under observation. Interviewing six 
participants from the three maintenance control rooms took 
approximately 12 h.
Fig. 1  Research framework and methods
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3.2.2  Procedure
Ethical guidelines of the University of Nottingham were 
followed with approval from the University of Nottingham 
Faculty of Engineering Ethics committee. Participants were 
assured about data confidentiality and their anonymity.
Participants were asked to think of the most recent chal-
lenging fault situations they had gone through. These inci-
dents were selected by participants as critical or challenging 
ones. Therefore, as well as informing the steps of decision-
making, the choices of participants also provided an insight 
into their perception of what constitutes a challenging fault 
analysis situation.
The incident was then reviewed using a set of probes 
based on the CDM (O’Hare et al. 1998). Each of the four 
stages for fault handling (notification, acceptance, analysis, 
clearance) was discussed, using any of the following probes, 
as appropriate:
1. How did you become aware of the fault? What was the 
cue in identification of the problem?
2. What was the most important piece of information that 
helped you in making your decision?
3. How certain were you regarding the information pro-
vided to you?
4. How did you integrate all different sources of informa-
tion to come to a conclusion?
5. What artefacts did you use?
6. In what order did you attend to various pieces of infor-
mation?
7. How aware were you regarding your surroundings as 
well as the fault’s context?
Once a given fault episode was completed, the process 
was repeated until the time available with each participant 
ended. Typically, this resulted in four faults per participant. 
A total of 24 fault episodes were recorded.
Due to the interviews being conducted in a live opera-
tional environment, data were not audio recorded but con-
temporaneous notes were taken using an analysis spread-
sheet, discussed below.
3.2.3  Analysis
It is appreciated that obtaining an in-depth understanding 
of strategies used for problem solving requires far more 
detailed and extended data collection than merely finding 
a pattern through a number of questions. However, these 
data are useful in developing a general view of operator’s 
potential approaches to overcome complications while they 
are attending to a fault.
A decision analysis spreadsheet was developed to assist 
with grouping and structuring the functions of fault analysis 
with factors adopted from the CDM (O’Hare et al. 1998). 
Table 2 below shows an example of a completed spread-
sheet for one of the fault analyses cases. The four stages of 
fault analysis are presented in the ‘goals/activities’ column. 
Additional notes and comments on design recommendations 
were also recorded for each alarm handling stage and further 
reviewed.
Participants’ comments regarding questions covering 
what the most important piece of information was, how cer-
tain were they regarding the information provided to them, 
and how did they integrate all sources of information to a 
conclusion, provided cues as to the strategies they use to 
overcome information deficiencies. These were then mapped 
to the list of coping strategies adopted from Hollnagel and 
Woods (2005) presented in Table 1. A separate 1-h-long 
meeting with one of the maintenance technicians at location 
A was used to verify and reconfirm the identified strategies.
Further analysis examined the differences in terms of 
activities and strategies in relation to the type of artefacts 
and system distribution available in each control room. 
Decision ladders developed for each of the control rooms 
provided a means for comparing activities and strategies in 
each of the control rooms. Activities and strategies were 
first compared in terms of the available artefacts in each 
control room and then compared in terms of the distribution 
of maintenance workstation within its larger control setting.
4  Results
4.1  Maintenance control centres
4.1.1  Functional overview
Observation and discussion with staff confirmed the basic 
principles of Maintenance Control Centres (MCCs). These 
are facilities with responsibility for maintaining the railway 
infrastructure. This ranges from maintenance of Signalling 
and Telecommunication facilities to Electrical and buildings 
as well as track-borne infrastructure (e.g. point machines, 
track circuits). In GB, MCCs are widespread across the 
country and are equipped with various legacy systems. This 
variation is partially rooted in regional investments and 
traffic-related needs of various locations. In addition, there 
are various control centres (referred to as National Control 
Centres) which monitor the performance of a wider region. 
Figure 2 shows an example of operator workstation in a 
National Control Centre.
Three types of MCC are typical of the GB rail network.
• The first is focused on the performance of the railway 
service infrastructures (i.e. signals and point machines). 
This is relatively local, and the maintenance control com-
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prises a workstation located within a signal box respon-
sible for regulating rail traffic (Maintenance location A).
• The second type refers to maintenance control systems 
that are integrated and focused on a larger area of cover-
age and contain both service-related infrastructure and 
the railway assets such as buildings and power boxes 
(Maintenance location B).
• The third type of control centre is focused on a region 
within the railway network and monitors both service-
related infrastructure and assets, and also monitor 
weather related conditions that impact the state of the 
assets (e.g. wind gust and ice). This type of centre con-
trols and maintains the route and includes a number of 
operators, such as train operator company’s representa-
tives, regulators, and maintenance technicians. (Mainte-
nance location C).
Examples of all three types of control room were visited 
as part of the study—see Table 3.
4.1.2  Role of the maintenance technician
The maintenance technician is responsible for detecting 
and dealing with operational failures, attending to fault 
logs, monitoring equipment to facilitate predictive main-
tenance and planning periodic and long-term maintenance 
checks. They support the railway service and provide aids 
to operational staff. In doing so, there are situations where 
maintenance technicians need to go to the site of a specific 
asset and locate asset-related information from the adjacent 
loggers and sensors. None of the control centres are staffed 
24/7.
4.1.3  Fault management processes
When a fault is being reported, various types of information 
are presented to the operator: location, equipment type and a 
brief indication of the fault. These may also occur as alarms 
within the maintenance control room to notify the operator 
of an infrastructure malfunction or abnormality. Logbooks 
are also used to record information: the date, the technician 
who had attended to the fault, Fault Management System 
(FMS) number, equipment type (e.g. point machine, main 
signal, position light signal) and equipment ID, controller 
unit, field unit, indication of a common fault (e.g. lamp fail-
ure, lost reverse detection, earth alarm, etc.) and common fix 
(e.g. filter unit replaced, etc.), as well as the current status of 
that fault (fixed, active, unknown or cleared on own). Finally, 
a more detailed description of each fault can be found in the 
report that is automatically generated.
The operators then assess the fault through their asset 
monitoring equipment and re-play the asset behaviour 
towards the moment of its failure and diagnose the fault. 
Often, operators would require further information to build a 
mental image of the situation that led to the failure. This then 
is followed by sending a specialised track team to the field 
to rectify the failure and resume the normal service. During 
this process, maintenance controllers are in communication 
with signallers, route managers, and other operational staff 
Fig. 2  Maintenance workstation in Maintenance Control Centre at 
location C (National Control Centre)
Table 3  The three maintenance control rooms of the present study
Maintenance control 
location
A B C
Type Signalling maintenance Signalling maintenance National control centre
Location Local (in the same room as the 
signaller)
Local (in the same room as the signaller) Central (route control)
RCM 1. Infrastructure event log 1. Asset monitoring
2. Track monitoring
3. Point condition monitoring
1. Wheel monitoring
2. Track monitoring
3. Point monitoring
4. Weather monitoring
5. Asset monitoring
6. Train monitoring
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to develop and share a good understanding of the impact of 
the failure on the service.
4.1.4  Maintenance control contexts
These maintenance control rooms had various ranges of 
condition monitoring equipment. The comparison of these 
three provided insights into how operators cope and adapt 
to the technological innovations that are being added to their 
existing control environments. It is interesting to note that 
the scope and high-level activities and roles of these mainte-
nance operators were very similar. The main difference was 
due to the geographical location, area of coverage and more 
importantly the technological capabilities that have become 
available to operators in each of these control rooms.
Workstation at location A: The workstation had seven 
information displays. Artefacts available to the mainte-
nance technicians included equipment linked to various 
fault monitoring and remote condition monitoring systems 
for monitoring the state of point machines and track circuits 
based on data from on-track sensors and loggers. Some of 
these interfaces were web-based, while others comprised 
stand-alone software applications. Systems available to the 
technicians had different interfaces that are not always con-
sistent in terms of their basic presentation. Apart from the 
use of similar colour coding (e.g. red for alarms and green 
for cleared), the format for information presentation differed 
between different interfaces. In addition to the condition 
monitoring facilities, signalling displays of the area under 
coverage and Control Centre of the Future (CCF) (a wide 
area view of the regional network) were also available to the 
signalling technicians.
Control room at location A only had logging facilities 
equipped with alarms to notify the maintenance opera-
tor when the logged value was above a certain threshold. 
Additionally, since the technicians were located in the same 
signal box as the signaller, they could overhear relevant 
information (e.g. signallers commenting that a point was 
not behaving as normal) and this, in turn, formed another 
source of their information when it came to identify the 
occurrence of a failure.
Workstation at location B: This workstation consisted 
of six information displays. These include five integrated 
information displays and one display used for web-based 
applications, as well as the administrative tasks that the 
maintenance technician needed to fulfil as part of their 
duties. The information displays on the workstation provided 
information regarding signalling workstations, power supply, 
monitoring facilities for the office equipment, modems and 
other communication links. Location B has some predic-
tive monitoring capability, but the system only covered local 
assets. These provided operators with detailed trends and 
graphs associated with the fault that assist them in diagnos-
ing faults.
Workstation at location C: This workstation consisted 
of nine displays. These covered various asset types, point 
monitoring, and wheel monitoring, but also a rich range of 
contextual information including weather monitoring and 
train schedules. A display was also dedicated to e-mail and 
other information resources. Location C was a national 
control centre and not only had many predictive monitoring 
solutions, but also covered a large geographical area. This 
technology provided diagnostic support, assisting operators 
in a more confident acceptance of the fault. The wide range 
of RCM equipment in the control room provided operators 
with duplicated information which could be beneficial in 
supporting diagnoses, though in some cases generated exces-
sive information.
Looking through the range of control facilities and infor-
mation displays, a number of features are common. First, 
operators have access to a number of legacy systems. Sec-
ond, the information presentation formats are different 
from one system to another, even within the same worksta-
tion. Third, tasks and activities of the operators remained 
ostensibly the same. While this was the outcome from the 
observation and familiarisation, the CDM aimed to ascertain 
whether this held true for operators cognitive processing and 
strategies.
4.2  Fault analysis through critical decision method
A total of 24 fault analysis episodes were recorded and ana-
lysed through the Critical Decision Method technique—nine 
of these fault analysis episodes were recorded in location A, 
nine in location B, and seven in location C.
From the 24 cases of fault finding, 13 different types 
of faults were selected by maintenance technicians. These 
faults are perceived by the operators to be the most recurring 
and challenging cases. False alarms, point failures and signal 
failures were selected more than other cases. The distribu-
tion of fault types is shown in Fig. 3.
These faults are selected by technicians due to both their 
frequency (i.e. false alarm is a constant occurrence) and their 
severity [i.e., point and signal failure can seriously impact 
the service (Golightly and Dadashi 2017)]. The fault process 
can be summarised across the four stages as follows
Notification When a fault is being reported, the opera-
tor is made aware of it. As well as getting alerted through 
another controller and audible and visual channels, the oper-
ator also has to identify the location from which the fault has 
originated and needs to start analysing the faulty situation on 
the basis of their local knowledge and experience.
Acceptance The second stage is to identify whether the 
fault is genuine or not. This is to assess the credibility of the 
data presented. If the fault is not genuine and the operator 
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imposes an unnecessary speed restriction or even stops a 
train to send an investigation team to the track, this can lead 
to unnecessary delays and a waste of time and resources, as 
well as excess costs in terms of delay attribution fines.
Analysis The third stage of fault analysis is to assess the 
fault, seek potential causes of the fault and diagnose it.
Clearance Finally, the fourth stage refers to the develop-
ment and evaluation of the optimum corrective action.
Nineteen of the fault cases followed this basic process. In 
the remaining five cases, where the technician was not com-
pletely certain whether the fault was authentic or not, a test 
of authenticity was performed and, in of which two of the 
cases where there was a false alarm, the technician assessed 
the causes associated with the generation of a false alarm. In 
these five cases, upon confirming the authenticity of the fault 
episode, the cause was diagnosed, and a corrective course 
of action was selected.
4.3  Decision ladders
A canonical Decision Ladder was developed representing 
the basic process of fault identification and analysis in loca-
tion A. This is shown in Fig. 4, with the transition between 
incoming notification of a fault, through to acceptance and 
analysis and planning a course of action. These four areas 
are circled on the diagram.
One of the research questions in this study was whether 
changes in the artefacts and equipment available to operators 
would affect the process of fault analysis. Therefore, further 
decision ladders of problem were developed, based on the 
data from the CDM interviews. The decision ladders of fault 
analysis in locations ‘B’ and ‘C’ are shown in Figs. 5 and 
6 respectively.
The shaded areas in Figs. 5 and 6 refer to the activities 
that are being assisted through the artefacts available in 
those control rooms. Although the workstation at location 
‘A’ had no noticeable support from any advanced equipment 
in their room, ‘B’ and ‘C’ used various technologies to diag-
nose faults and assist the investigation process. The second 
stage (confirmation) and the third stage (diagnosis) benefit-
ted from increased analytical support. Most notably, at work-
stations ‘A’ and ‘B’ when operators wanted to check if the 
fault is genuine, they applied their knowledge of the fault 
location and the history of that asset. In control room at loca-
tion ‘C’ operators had more trust in the system, potentially 
because the equipment had been maintained more regularly 
and alarm thresholds had been updated fairly recently. The 
sophisticated nature of fault management systems, and the 
strategic nature of the role of operators in this control room, 
contributed to this difference.
4.4  Strategies
Both the familiarisation studies and the CDM interview 
findings identified regular strategies and tactics applied 
by maintenance operators. Comments recorded during the 
CDM study were assessed against Hollnagel and Woods’ 
(2005) coping strategies (Table 1). Table 4 shows partici-
pants’ responses to the questions for the selection of fault 
analysis episodes, with probes around cues and information 
seeking being particularly relevant to uncovering strategies.
Deficiencies in information presentation were one of the 
main challenges facing the participants endeavouring to deal 
optimally with faults. There were at least six information 
displays on a technician’s workstation. While it is essential 
that duplication of information is inevitable due to safety 
critical issues associated with their roles, technicians also 
identified difficulties with unnecessarily redundant infor-
mation and misleading data. Additionally, temporal aspects 
Fig. 3  Number of the faults 
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associated with handling alarms often meant that techni-
cians did not have sufficient time to exhaustively search for 
information to handle the fault effectively. Hence, they were 
selected as representative cases for the CDM.
The seven faults listed in Table 4 are identified by par-
ticipants as challenging due to some form of information 
deficiency and, therefore, would be appropriate candidates to 
explore operator’s strategies when dealing with information 
deficiencies. Strategies are presented in brackets. The strat-
egies adopted by maintenance technicians to analyse the 
faults include categorising, filtering, queuing, similarity 
matching and extrapolation. However, participants also 
tend to use the frequency of occurrence of events in the 
past as a basis for recognition (frequency gambling). Many 
of these strategies (categorising, filtering, queuing) were in 
response to the high number of alarms that were generated, 
Fig. 4  Decision ladder for fault analysis in control room at location ‘A’
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sometimes by the same fault, and as a means of manag-
ing tasks. Similarity matching, extrapolation and frequency 
gambling were more relevant to the interpretation of events, 
and how to make sense on both the genuineness of the alarm, 
the causes, and therefore the restorative action, given factors 
such as previous occurrences at that location, and similar 
events elsewhere.
When comparing the three control environments, both 
locations ‘A’ and ‘B’ showed similar strategies, though 
participants at location ‘B’ did not need to do as much 
Fig. 5  Decision ladder for fault analysis in control room at location ‘B’
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‘filtering’ and ‘categorising’ since their more advanced 
condition monitoring systems helped with searching and 
grouping faults. However, they still used ‘extrapolation’ 
and ‘similarity matching’ when it came to identify and 
assessing whether the fault was genuine at the ‘acceptance’ 
stage. At location ‘C’, operations were more centralised, 
and operators have access both to more information and 
more advanced analytics, removing the need for ‘filter-
ing’ and ‘categorising’. The key aspects of the fault are 
clear and unambiguous. Also, because there was sufficient 
integration of information, operators in location ‘C’ had to 
resort to less ‘extrapolation’ to fill too many gaps in their 
Fig. 6  Decision ladder for fault analysis in control room at location ‘C’
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interpretation of a fault. However, operators still engaged 
in ‘similarity matching’ by recalling a similar scenario 
to diagnose the fault and an appropriate course of action.
5  Discussion
The study reported in this paper had three aims—to shed 
light on the cognitive work of rail maintenance controllers, 
which is a critical role, but has received little attention; to 
determine design recommendations for the development of 
future maintenance automation in the form of ‘Intelligent 
Infrastructure’; and to understand the value of the combina-
tion of methods used.
In terms of the nature of the maintenance role, the results 
suggest that maintenance is a cognitive task, adhering to 
conventional models of alarm/fault handling, and reliant on 
different levels of automation which play an increasing role. 
What is less expected is the variation in the role depending 
on location and scope of functions, though this matches the 
similar experience of rail signalling (Pickup et al. 2013). The 
analysis clearly suggests that local conditions and needs, 
both in the maintenance control box and for the infrastruc-
ture covered, is an important factor when reflecting on the 
nature of work. It is also interesting that ‘active overhearing’ 
and the ability to work with others is an advantage in some 
of these environments (location A). This suggests a team 
and distributed, rather than purely individual, orientation 
to the work.
One interesting aspect of the analysis is that the choice 
of faults for the knowledge elicitation (Fig. 3) is perceived 
by the operators to be either the most recurring or challeng-
ing cases. False alarms, point failures and signal failure 
were selected more than other cases. These faults affect the 
immediate operation of the railways and operators found 
them more challenging, possibly due to the time pressure 
felt while analysing these fault situations. It is worth noting 
that a study of signallers and controllers in rail disruption 
(Golightly and Dadashi 2017) also identified point and sig-
nal failures as amongst the most challenging events, due to 
the wide-ranging causes and the need for extended diagno-
sis. It seems that, in most instances, operators did not have 
a clear view of the fault (e.g. due to the lost communication 
between the sensor and the logger in ‘lost data link’) while, 
in other instances, they had too much information to analyse. 
Support for these cases would appear to be an area where 
there could be a significant gain for operations. It is, there-
fore, the case that these events are worth of special attention, 
both cognitively, in terms of high-quality sensing and algo-
rithms, and in terms of Human–Machine Interaction (HMI).
Data collected about fault analysis episodes suggest that 
the second stage (confirmation) and the third stage (diagno-
sis) benefit from advanced technologies which can take on Ta
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cognitive load. In both locations ‘A’ and ‘B’, when opera-
tors wanted to check if the fault is genuine, they relied on 
their knowledge of the fault location and the history of that 
asset. In location ‘C’, operators had more trust in the sys-
tem, potentially because of the sophistication of the fault 
management systems and the strategic nature of the role of 
operators in this control room. It highlights that maintenance 
fault finding is a complex set of activities, and that human 
judgement and machine intelligence are tightly connected, 
rather than independent (Hollnagel and Woods 2005). Being 
able to reflect this complex process in the form of a deci-
sion ladder which includes both human and automation as a 
single cognitive system will allow designers to consider this 
process more holistically in future.
Review of the strategies adopted by operators during 
fault-finding episodes revealed that ‘filtering’, ‘similarity 
matching’, and ‘categorising’ are, respectively, the most 
utilised coping strategies when facing information defi-
ciencies, particularly in those scenarios where responding 
to a fault is time critical and where thoroughness must be 
traded off against efficiency (Hollnagel 2011). Those points 
where coping strategies are applied indicate where automa-
tion may offer significant benefits. It also suggests that the 
design of HMI should support these functions and, similar 
to Golightly et al. (2018), rather than a black box of ‘red’, 
‘amber’, ‘green’, the automation should support exploration 
of the reasoning behind decisions so that both the cause, and 
potential rectifying action, can be understood.
In terms of the second aim of highlighting design con-
siderations emerging from the study, these are presented in 
Table 5. The design recommendations are primarily derived 
from the strategies but the point where they apply in the 
fault finding process can be mapped to the four stages, as 
captured in the decision ladder. The design consideration 
noted in this paper is not particularly surprising and echoes 
similar design principles and guidelines to many other user 
interfaces. However, corresponding these design considera-
tions to different cognitive processes and operators’ strate-
gies will allow designers to target these considerations at 
specific design components.
Finally, in terms of the third aim of applying methods that 
combine contextual and sequential approaches, this paper 
showcases a possibility of developing and understanding 
cognitive capabilities and strategies using a relatively simple 
knowledge elicitation technique but triangulated together. 
One of the key strengths of the method was to gain input 
from a senior member of staff early in the process. This not 
only identified the right (and varied) locations to perform 
the work, but also led to significant buy-in from the staff 
involved in the observation and the CDM.
There are limitations to the work. The numbers used are 
somewhat small, and while this is a specialist community, 
it would be useful to validate the work, especially as new 
developments are coming on line all the time in the Intel-
ligent Infrastructure space. Another limitation is confirm-
ing the level of understanding of participants regarding the 
strategies. While attempts were made to ensure they under-
stood the strategies, and while validation took place with 
a subject matter expert after the study, it would be useful 
to link the strategies back to more detailed and structured 
observation for confirmation.
6  Conclusions
Maintenance control fault finding is critical to rail perfor-
mance and safety. It is also a function under change through 
the increasing use of automation and ‘Intelligent Infra-
structure’. This study has shed light on the nature of this 
work, and how it varies by location and depending on the 
level of automation. Fault finding is a process of identify-
ing the alarm, dealing with its veracity (as there are many 
false alarms) and coming up with diagnosis and mitigat-
ing actions. While operators in control environments with 
wider areas of control and more forms of automated sup-
port are likely to value this technology, particularly in the 
diagnostic phase, all roles use coping strategies to deal with 
gaps in information and, often, duplication and a surfeit of 
information.
Fundamentally, this work is a first step to describing the 
combination of human problem solving and automation in 
maintenance fault finding as an integrated unit of analysis 
as defined in cognitive systems engineering (Hollnagel and 
Woods 2005). This is vital if we are to avoid the pitfalls of 
data-driven, bottom-up design of automation, and instead 
move to a top-down decision-led model of design. The work 
has also uncovered false alarms, point failures and signal 
failures as key scenarios to support.
Future work includes the detailed design and validation 
of the design principles shown in Table 5. An additional and 
useful avenue of work would be to continue to understand 
the nature of maintenance control and how it interacts with, 
and supports, other rail functions. Walker et al. (2006) have 
used the Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST) 
approach to study the role of maintenance in trackwork. 
EAST can also embody automation as an actor in a team. 
We advise applying this method to fault finding to fully map 
out the actors (including automation), tasks and information 
in this distributed activity, to determine key dependencies, 
fragilities and points of potential support. Eventually, this 
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could be linked into existing analyses of other functions 
involved in the disruption management process as described 
in Golightly and Dadashi (2017).
Acknowledgements We would like to acknowledge and thank Network 
Rail, both as participants in this study and as funder for the first author 
as part of a PhD in Human Factors for Intelligent Infrastructure.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes 
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are 
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in 
the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will 
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a 
copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
References
Aboelmaged MG (2014) Predicting e-readiness at firm-level: an anal-
ysis of technological, organizational and environmental (TOE) 
effects on e-maintenance readiness in manufacturing firms. Int J 
Inf Manag 34(5):639–651
Bainbridge L (1997) The change in concepts needed to account for 
human behavior in complex dynamic tasks. IEEE Trans Syst Man 
Cybern Part A Syst Hum 27(3):351–359
Banks VA, Plant KL, Stanton NA (2020) Leaps and shunts: designing 
pilot decision aids on the flight deck using Rasmussen’s ladder. 
In: Charles R, Golightly D (eds) Contemporary ergonomics and 
human factors 2020.
Belmonte F, Schön W, Heurley L, Capel R (2011) Interdisciplinary 
safety analysis of complex socio-technological systems based on 
the functional resonance accident model: an application to railway 
traffic supervision. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 96(2):237–249
Butcher L (2012) Railways: accidents. House of Commons: London, 
2012a [cit. 2012-11-24]. Dostupné z: http://www.parli ament .uk/
briefi ng-78
Table 5  Design considerations
Guidance Associated cognitive stages + strategies Rationale
Reduce the number of alarms and faults Notification and acceptance
Filtering and categorising
Large number of alarms was logged, many of 
which were false and nuisance alarms and 
occasionally they were misleading and caused 
the operator to miss the real alarm. Intelligent 
screening and sorting will be required (although 
the history of alarm mismanagement from human 
factors literature show that this is easier said than 
done)
Integrate the remote condition monitoring and 
fault management systems
Analysis
Similarity matching and extrapolation
There are various forms of remote condition moni-
toring and fault management systems available 
to the operators. This problem is twofold. On one 
hand the Future Maintenance Control Centres 
have to collate probably inconsistent data to 
generate a consistent advice to the operators. On 
the other hand, operators can get confused if their 
systems are showing them repetitive data and in 
different forms and types
Avoid presenting too much information to the 
operators
Acceptance and analysis
Similarity matching, extrapolation and 
frequency gambling
The majority of coping strategies recorded dur-
ing the CDM interviews refer to those that are 
targeted at coping with too much information. It 
is important to identify and apply the sufficient 
level of information to the operators. Moreover, 
transferring huge amount of data from sensors 
and loggers to information displays in control 
room can be very costly
Provide a reminder facility on the interface Analysis and clearance
Filtering and categorising
Operators used paper-based reminders to make 
sure they will attend to the important faults. 
It is important to assess the optimal format of 
the reminder facility (i.e. on paper or on the 
interface)
Provide information in a way that is easily cat-
egorised
Notification and acceptance
Categorising and filtering
Fault-finding strategies when operators are noticing 
and accepting faults is generally through cat-
egorising and filtering the data. MCC operators 
categorise and filter alarm banner and capture 
the cues associated with identifying and handling 
specific fault episodes. Designers and developers 
can support this strategy by providing data in a 
more distinct format that are easier to categories
Cognition, Technology & Work 
1 3
Ciocoiu L, Siemieniuch CE, Hubbard EM (2015) The changes from 
preventative to predictive maintenance: the organisational chal-
lenge. In: Proceedings of 5th international rail human factors con-
ference, London, September 2015
Ciocoiu L, Siemieniuch CE, Hubbard EM (2017) From preventative to 
predictive maintenance: The organisational challenge. Proc Inst 
Mech Eng Part F: J Rail Rapid Transit 231(10):1174–1185
Costello F, Watts P (2014) Surprisingly rational: probability theory 
plus noise explains biases in judgment. Psychol Rev 121(3):463
Dadashi N, Wilson JR, Golightly D, Sharples S (2014) A framework to 
support human factors of automation in railway intelligent infra-
structure. Ergonomics 57(3):387–402
Dadashi N, Wilson JR, Golightly D, Sharples S (2016) Alarm handling 
for health monitoring: operator strategies used in an electrical 
control room of a rail network. Proc Inst Mech Eng Part F J Rail 
Rapid Transit 230(5):1415–1428
Dekker S (2018) Automation and situation awareness–pushing the 
research frontier. In Coping with computers in the cockpit. Rout-
ledge, pp 69–86
Durazo-Cardenas I, Starr A, Turner CJ, Tiwari A, Kirkwood L, Bev-
ilacqua M et al (2018) An autonomous system for maintenance 
scheduling data-rich complex infrastructure: fusing the rail-
ways’ condition, planning and cost. Transp Res Part C Emerg 
Technol 89:234–253
Golightly D, Dadashi N (2017) The characteristics of railway service 
disruption: implications for disruption management. Ergonom-
ics 60(3):307–320
Golightly D, Ryan B, Dadashi N, Pickup L, Wilson JR (2013) Use 
of scenarios and function analyses to understand the impact of 
situation awareness on safe and effective work on rail tracks. 
Saf Sci 56:52–62
Golightly D, Kefalidou G, Sharples S (2018) A cross-sector analy-
sis of human and organisational factors in the deployment of 
data-driven predictive maintenance. Inf Syst e-Bus Manag 
16(3):627–648
Hollnagel E (2011) RAG-The resilience analysis grid. Resilience engi-
neering in practice. A guidebook. Ashgate, Farnham, UK
Hollnagel E, Woods DD (2005) Joint cognitive systems: foundations 
of cognitive systems engineering. CRC Press, Boca Raton
Houghton RJ, Patel H (2015) Interface design for prognostic asset 
maintenance. In: Proceedings 19th triennial congress of the 
IEA, vol 9, p 14
Johannsen G (1997) Cooperative human–machine interfaces for 
plant-wide control and communication. Annu Rev Control 
21:159–170
Kefalidou G, Golightly D, Sharples S (2015) Understanding factors for 
design and deployment of predictive maintenance. In: Proceed-
ings of 5th international rail human factors conference, London, 
September 2015
Khan AM (2007) Intelligent infrastructure-based queue-end warning 
system for avoiding rear impacts. IET Int Transp Syst 2:138–143
Klein GA, Calderwood R, Macgregor D (1989) Critical decision 
method for eliciting knowledge. IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern 
19(3):462–472
Márquez FPG, Schmid F, Collado JC (2003) A reliability centered 
approach to remote condition monitoring. A railway points case 
study. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 80(1):33–40
O’Hare D, Wiggins M, Williams A, Wong W (1998) Cognitive task 
analyses for decision centred design and training. Ergonomics 
41(11):1698–1718
Ollier BD (2006) Intelligent Infrastructure the business challenge. In: 
2006 IET international conference on railway condition monitor-
ing. IET, pp 1–6
Pant R, Hall JH, Blainey SP (2016) Vulnerability assessment frame-
work for interdependent critical infrastructures: case-study 
for Great Britain’s rail network. Eur J Transp Infrastruct Res 
16(1):174–194
Pedregal DJ, Garcı́a FP, Schmid F (2004) RCM2 predictive mainte-
nance of railway systems based on unobserved components mod-
els. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 83(1):103–110
Pickup L, Balfe N, Lowe E, Wilson JR (2013) He’s not from around 
here: the significance of local knowledge. In: Dadashi N, Scott 
A, Wilson JR, Mills A (eds) Rail human factors: supporting reli-
ability, safety and cost reduction. Taylor & Francis, pp 357–366
Rail Accident Investigation Branch (2011) Rail accident report: derail-
ment at grayrigg 23 February 2007. Report 20/2008 v5 July 2011. 
Rail Accident Investigation Branch, Department for Transport, 
Derby
Ranjan R, Garg S, Khoskbar AR, Solaiman E, James P, Georgako-
poulos D (2017) Orchestrating bigdata analysis workflows. IEEE 
Cloud Comput 4(3):20–28
Rasmussen J (1986) Information processing and human–machine inter-
action. Elsevier Science Pub. Co., Inc., New York
Rasmussen Jens, Lind M (1982) A model of human decision making 
in complex systems. Roskilde, Denmark
Seagull FJ, Sanderson PM (2001) Anesthesia alarms in context: an 
observational study. Hum Factors J Hum Factors Ergon Soc 
43(1):66–78
Shafiee M, Labib A, Maiti J, Starr A (2019) Maintenance strategy 
selection for multi-component systems using a combined analytic 
network process and cost-risk criticality model. Proc Inst Mech 
Eng Part O J Risk Reliab 233(2):89–104
Shift2Rail (2015) Shift2Rail Masterplan. https ://ec.europ a.eu/trans 
port/sites /trans port/files /modes /rail/doc/2015-03-31-decis ionn4 
-2015-adopt ion-s2r-maste rplan .pdf. Accessed 21 Jan 2020
Stanton NA (2006) Alarm initiated activities. In: Karwowski W (ed) 
International encyclopaedia of ergonomics and human factors, 
2nd edn. Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, Abingdon, pp 1008–1011
Sundh J, Juslin P (2018) Compound risk judgment in tasks with both 
idiosyncratic and systematic risk: the “Robust Beauty” of additive 
probability integration. Cognition 171:25–41
Transportfocus (2017) Routine railway maintenance: passenger per-
spectives and priorities (December), 1–8, London
van Amstel-van Saane MH (2007) Twilight on self-regulation: a socio-
legal evaluation of conservation and sustainable use of agrobio-
diversity by industry self-regulation, vol 362. KNAG, Chicago
Vicente KJ (1999) Cognitive work analysis: towards safe, productive, 
and healthy computer-based work. CRC Press, Boca Raton
Vileiniskis M, Remenyte-Prescott R, Rama D (2016) A fault detection 
method for railway point systems. Proc Inst Mech Eng Part F J 
Rail Rapid Transit 230(3):852–865
Walker GH, Gibson H, Stanton NA, Baber C, Salmon P, Green D 
(2006) Event analysis of systemic teamwork (EAST): a novel 
integration of ergonomics methods to analyse C4i activity. Ergo-
nomics 49(12–13):1345–1369
Wilkinson J, Lucas D (2002) Better alarm handling-a practical applica-
tion of human factors. Meas Control 35(2):52–54
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
